69 research outputs found
Social diversity favors the emergence of cooperative behavior
Throughout their life, humans often engage in public goods games in situations ranging from family related issues to global warming. In all cases, the tragedy of the commons threatens the possibility of reaching the optimal solution associated with global cooperation. Up to now, individuals have been treated as equivalent in all respects, in sharp contrast with real life situations, where diversity abounds. Here we discuss the results reported in [Santos et al. Nature (2008) 454:213-6], where we show how social diversity provides an escape from this paradox. We investigate the impact of social diversity in the evolution of cooperation in complex networks of interaction. We show that the diversity in the number and size of the collective endeavors each individual participates and with the individual contribution to each investment promotes cooperation. The enhancement of cooperation is particularly strong when both wealth and social ties follow a power-law distribution, providing clues on the self-organization of social communities.SCOPUS: cp.pinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe
Self-organization of punishment in structured populations
Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human
species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bare additional
costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the
fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing
this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in
dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both, the spontaneous
emergence of punishment, as well as its ability to deter defectors and those
unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of
phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate
that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation either through the
invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic
dominance, or through the provision of competitive advantages to those that
sanction antisocial behavior. Presented results indicate that the process of
self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and
they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread
social behavior could have evolved.Comment: 13 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of
Physic
The evolution of prompt reaction to adverse ties
SCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe
Cancer phenotype as the outcome of an evolutionary game between normal and malignant cells
There is variability in the cancer phenotype across individuals: two patients with the same tumour may experience different disease life histories, resulting from genetic variation within the tumour and from the interaction between tumour and host. Until now, phenotypic variability has precluded a clear-cut identification of the fundamental characteristics of a given tumour type.Journal ArticleResearch Support, Non-U.S. Gov'tSCOPUS: ar.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe
Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
Our wellbeing depends as much on our personal success, as it does on the
success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation a very
much needed trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our
readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a
cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remain elusive. Here
we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence
on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that
instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from
indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of
coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal
fascinatingly reach social dynamics that explains why this costly behavior has
evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover
an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding that is due to over-aggression, which in
turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why,
despite of its success, rewarding is not as firmly weaved into our societal
organization as punishment.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of
Physic
Reply: Evolutionary game theory: lessons and limitations, a cancer perspective
SCOPUS: le.jinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishe
Effects of dimers on cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
We investigate the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in structured
populations by introducing dimers, which are defined as that two players in
each dimer always hold a same strategy. We find that influences of dimers on
cooperation depend on the type of dimers and the population structure. For
those dimers in which players interact with each other, the cooperation level
increases with the number of dimers though the cooperation improvement level
depends on the type of network structures. On the other hand, the dimers, in
which there are not mutual interactions, will not do any good to the
cooperation level in a single community, but interestingly, will improve the
cooperation level in a population with two communities. We explore the
relationship between dimers and self-interactions and find that the effects of
dimers are similar to that of self-interactions. Also, we find that the dimers,
which are established over two communities in a multi-community network, act as
one type of interaction through which information between communities is
communicated by the requirement that two players in a dimer hold a same
strategy.Comment: 12 pages and 3 figure
Resolution of the stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma by means of particle swarm optimization
We study the evolution of cooperation among selfish individuals in the
stochastic strategy spatial prisoner's dilemma game. We equip players with the
particle swarm optimization technique, and find that it may lead to highly
cooperative states even if the temptations to defect are strong. The concept of
particle swarm optimization was originally introduced within a simple model of
social dynamics that can describe the formation of a swarm, i.e., analogous to
a swarm of bees searching for a food source. Essentially, particle swarm
optimization foresees changes in the velocity profile of each player, such that
the best locations are targeted and eventually occupied. In our case, each
player keeps track of the highest payoff attained within a local topological
neighborhood and its individual highest payoff. Thus, players make use of their
own memory that keeps score of the most profitable strategy in previous
actions, as well as use of the knowledge gained by the swarm as a whole, to
find the best available strategy for themselves and the society. Following
extensive simulations of this setup, we find a significant increase in the
level of cooperation for a wide range of parameters, and also a full resolution
of the prisoner's dilemma. We also demonstrate extreme efficiency of the
optimization algorithm when dealing with environments that strongly favor the
proliferation of defection, which in turn suggests that swarming could be an
important phenomenon by means of which cooperation can be sustained even under
highly unfavorable conditions. We thus present an alternative way of
understanding the evolution of cooperative behavior and its ubiquitous presence
in nature, and we hope that this study will be inspirational for future efforts
aimed in this direction.Comment: 12 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON
Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of
each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation,
we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas,
where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual
fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the
evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show
that plugging into the "wisdom of groups" strongly promotes cooperative
behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the
evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically
decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different
domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently
invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and
establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving
social dilemmas.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 7 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific
Report
Multi-level evidence of an allelic hierarchy of USH2A variants in hearing, auditory processing and speech/language outcomes.
Language development builds upon a complex network of interacting subservient systems. It therefore follows that variations in, and subclinical disruptions of, these systems may have secondary effects on emergent language. In this paper, we consider the relationship between genetic variants, hearing, auditory processing and language development. We employ whole genome sequencing in a discovery family to target association and gene x environment interaction analyses in two large population cohorts; the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) and UK10K. These investigations indicate that USH2A variants are associated with altered low-frequency sound perception which, in turn, increases the risk of developmental language disorder. We further show that Ush2a heterozygote mice have low-level hearing impairments, persistent higher-order acoustic processing deficits and altered vocalizations. These findings provide new insights into the complexity of genetic mechanisms serving language development and disorders and the relationships between developmental auditory and neural systems
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